

Chapter 6

Loewald, Heidegger, and Freud

A Dialogue

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Introduction

The period between 1923 and 1933 was a pivotal decade in European philosophy. In Germany, several branches of Neo-Kantianism predominated in academic circles. Martin Heidegger began teaching at Marburg and, over the next four years, developed an entire new way of doing philosophy. The publication of *Being and Time* in 1927 set a tone which would dominate European philosophy, for or against, up to the present day. But Heidegger became a Nazi. By his account, he was trying to protect the university, but many others felt a betrayal of his Jewish colleagues and a background of antisemitism. Our story concerns one of those junior colleagues who felt betrayed, Hans Loewald, then studying with Heidegger. Loewald left the field of philosophy, eventually studying medicine and psychiatry and becoming a distinguished psychoanalyst in the United States. He has acknowledged his gratitude to Heidegger (Loewald 1980), yet his published work makes almost no allusions to Heidegger's ideas. I will develop the thesis that Loewald's psychoanalytic ideas, revolutionary in their own right, resulted from a three-way dialogue between himself, Heidegger, and Freud. The dialogue with Freud is conscious and results in a revision of fundamental psychoanalytic concepts, while the dialogue with Heidegger is unstated and unacknowledged, yet perhaps just as fundamental. I will suggest that Loewald used Heideggerian concepts to help psychoanalysis come alive, just as Heidegger wanted to enliven Kantian ideas.

The Participants

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirch, Baden-Württemberg, in 1889.¹ His interest in philosophy first arose during his high school studies in Freiburg when, at the age of 17, he read Franz Brentano's (1995) book entitled *On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle*. By his own account, it was this work that inspired his life-long quest for the meaning of being. Brentano is a central figure in our story, who unites Heidegger, Husserl, and Freud through his intellectual influence. Heidegger entered a Jesuit seminary in 1909 but eventually turned to studies in philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences. Having completed a habilitation thesis in 1915, he was appointed a Privatdozent at the University of Freiburg. He taught mostly courses in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy and regarded himself as standing in the service of

the Catholic worldview. This occurred in the backdrop of WWI, where Heidegger was mostly deferred for medical reasons. He married Elfride Petri in 1917, who, scholars later discovered, was openly antisemitic.

Nevertheless, Heidegger's turn from theology to philosophy was soon to be followed by another turn. In 1916, he became a junior colleague of Edmund Husserl, who pioneered the study of phenomenology. Heidegger's lectures on phenomenology and his creative interpretations of Aristotle earned him wide acclaim. Arendt (1971) puts it thusly:

Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say.

Laboring over the question of being, Heidegger soon began a radical reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. In 1923, Heidegger was appointed associate professor at Marburg University. He formed close friendships with Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann, both of whom incorporated Heidegger's ideas into their own philosophies. Hannah Arendt arrived in Marburg in 1923, an 18-year-old Jewish student with a forceful intellect. Heidegger took notice of her in February of 1924, invited her for a talk at his office, and their affair began soon after. Heidegger demanded total secrecy and a type of adulation, yet he had very little interest in her independent academic achievements. Safranski (1998) described her as Heidegger's muse for *Being and Time*. Heidegger suggested in 1925 that she move to Heidelberg, and the affair began to wind down.

Between 1923 and 1928, Heidegger enjoyed the most fruitful years of his teaching career. He attracted the best and brightest of philosophical students, many Jewish, and among these was Hans Loewald. Heidegger's students testified to the originality of his insight and the intensity of his philosophical questioning. He extended the scope of his lectures and taught courses on the history of philosophy, time, logic, phenomenology, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Leibniz; however, he had published nothing since 1916, a factor that threatened his future academic career. Finally, in February 1927, his fundamental but also unfinished treatise, *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*), appeared. Within a few years, this book was recognized as a truly epoch-making work of twentieth-century philosophy. It earned Heidegger in the fall of 1927 a full professorship at Marburg University and, one year later, after Husserl's retirement from teaching, the chair of philosophy at Freiburg University. *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962) has been hailed as one of the most significant texts in the canon of contemporary European Philosophy. It pushed Heidegger to a position of international intellectual visibility and provided the philosophical impetus for a number of later programs and ideas in the contemporary European tradition: Sartre's existentialism, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological perception, Derrida's notion of 'deconstruction', and Levinas' idea of the ethics of the Other.

Heidegger's life entered a problematic and controversial stage with Hitler's rise to power. When Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany in 1933, Heidegger, up to then virtually apolitical, became politically involved. He was elected rector of the University of Freiburg by the faculty. He later claimed he wanted to avoid the danger of a party functionary being appointed, but he also seemed to believe that he could steer

the Nazi movement in the right direction. He joined the Nazi party, and on May 27, 1933, he delivered his inaugural rectoral address on “The Self-Assertion of the German University” (Heidegger 1985). The ambiguous text of this speech has often been interpreted as an expression of his support for Hitler’s regime (Neske and Kettering 1990). During his tenure as rector, he produced a number of speeches for the Nazi cause and was much more active in supporting the Nazi party than he has publicly admitted to; he never renounced his Nazi affiliation. He participated in the removal of Jewish colleagues from the university, including his mentor, Husserl, and did nothing to help Arendt, who was briefly detained by the Gestapo. There is little doubt that during that time Heidegger placed the great prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of national socialism and thus, willingly or not, contributed to its legitimization among his fellow Germans (Safranski 1998). What Heidegger’s motivation was for joining the Nazi movement remains highly controversial, but in 1934, Heidegger resigned from his office and took no further part in politics. He was then criticized by the Nazi party. Following Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, Heidegger was accused of Nazi sympathies, was forbidden to teach in German universities, and in 1946 was dismissed from his chair of philosophy. This ban was lifted in 1949.

More recently, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (*Ponderings II–VI, Black Note Books 1931–1938*, 2017) from 1931 to 1941 have been published, and they contain scattered antisemitic passages²:

The Jews, with their marked gift for calculating, live, already for the longest time, according to the principle of race, which is why they are resisting its consistent application with utmost violence.

(quoted in Brody 2014)

Or:

Jews are “uprooted from Being-in-the World”—that is, incapable of authentically caring and knowing.

(quoted in Brody 2014)

This makes it clear that Heidegger was a committed antisemite well before the Nazis. Is this the personal opinion of a deeply flawed man, or does it contaminate the whole of his philosophy?

Safranski (1998) suggests that Hannah Arendt’s (1958) book, *The Human Condition*, written after the war without ever mentioning Heidegger’s name, criticized his philosophy. I believe it is a criticism that Loewald would have agreed with. She contrasts the *vita contemplativa* with the *vita activa*. Heidegger is the *vita contemplativa*, the philosopher, whose quest for Being and purity meant that he rejected the ordinary human world, what Heidegger (1962) called the *they* (*das Man*) (pp. 163–168). *Dasein*, in his view, is opposed to the Others who make up the *they*; Heidegger speaks of Being that will be taken over by the Others, submerged, subject to averageness, leaving Being to be leveled down. It is tempting for *Dasein* to want to escape into the *they*, to escape being-onto-death. The self of ordinary life is the *they-self*, which can be distinguished from the authentic self. Heidegger calls this publicness (*öffentlichkeit*) (p. 165). In one sense, this is right; there is often a need to escape authenticity through submission in a

group or culture. But Arendt raises the opposite concern; she argues that Heidegger, in rejecting the ordinary world of the They, is abandoning the ground of the human. She finds openness, not in a clearing toward Being, aloof from the polis, but in the public life of a shared world with other human beings, a place where persons encounter each other and must find a way to live together. She calls this the *Vita activa*, the human condition of action. It is inherently political; it creates the conditions for history. Appearance constitutes reality and the existence of a public realm. The term “public” signifies the world itself. We live together in a world that is common, and the things in the world lie among us. It gathers us together and prevents us from falling all over each other. Speech and action are the two modes of how humans appear to each other. By such we insert ourselves into the human world. In taking the initiative to begin to disclose who the others are, the unexpected can happen. This is true human freedom. Arendt’s (1971) view of Heidegger is that he, like Plato in *The Republic*, “succumbed to the temptation” of politics but “was young enough to learn from the shock of the collision”.

Arendt suggests that Heidegger sees himself as above the they, estranged from ordinary concerns of persons and stuck in the peaks of contemplation. He is left with Nothingness, and no fixed values, which is our modern concern. Heidegger readily becomes unhinged from moral concerns and is prey to the very thing he despises, group mentality, when he takes up Nazi ideology. There was a cult-like aspect to Heidegger. He was charismatic and revered by a large group of students and colleagues, many of them Jewish, yet he was arrogant, never admitted to mistakes, and showed little interest in the work of others. All of this was true for Arendt and, we can imagine, likely true for Loewald as well. Loewald was fatherless and must have embraced this larger-than-life man, only to be bitterly disappointed. I believe that Loewald embodied this contradiction; he applied Heidegger’s ideas on ontology to revive psychoanalysis, yet he abhorred Heidegger’s Nazism.

I think Arendt’s ideas raise more disturbing questions about the basic stance of modernity. We have steadily seen the loss of external moral values through the decline of religious moral codes. If God is dead, then everything is permitted; man is the measure of all things. Heidegger is the heir of Nietzsche. *Dasein* is authentically able to own and project its own projects and futures. But Heidegger’s embrace of National Socialism goes squarely against this philosophy. Hitler demanded the allegiance of the masses and projected hate toward outsiders, what Heidegger called the They. Could there be an emptiness and loneliness built into modernity that yearns to be filled? Does man need external support to feel secure? It is not just religious ideas that have been lost; there is a skepticism and loss of confidence in institutions of all sorts. This has led to a rise in authoritarianism and a return to orthodox religions for some, both reactions to this existential loss. Was Heidegger prey to the same forces, looking for a utopian faith in a movement larger than the self? What is the path forward for those of us who do not have faith and want to preserve the freedoms promised us by modern philosophy?

Finally, a number of authors have documented a disturbing trend in German intellectual life. In the eighteenth century, much of continental Europe was divided into numerous city-states (especially Germany and Italy). In the Romantic movement, a kind of romantic nationalism grew up longing to unite the national language with a country (Wilson 1973). Countries should be built on the traditions and myths of the past rather than existing political boundaries. Instinct and feeling are emphasized

over rationality. In Germany, Johann Gottfried Herder (2002) was responsible for the development of these ideas. He argued for the existence of individual cultural types, which he thought were largely determined by the physical environment of the country and language. Each nationality should develop along its own innate lines set out by history and nature. A number of German poets and philosophers were attracted to this ideal. But, in the early twentieth century, there followed a view of German exceptionalism, which included beliefs about the primordially of the German language, the intellectual superiority of German thought, and the moral purity of the German race (Sluga 1993). Heidegger added to this belief, as he thought that German culture was the direct heir of classical Greece. This is the dangerous path leading to ideas of racial purity and the holocaust. This suggests that Heidegger was caught up in romantic nationalism and thought that the Nazis would further this aim.

A series of seminars was initiated in 1947 by Dr. Medard Boss, one of the founders of Daseinanalysis, and continued with a yearly visit by Heidegger with a group of Swiss psychiatrists for over 20 years (Heidegger 2001; Keikhaee and Bell 2016). Boss had been one of Freud's analysands. Heidegger (2001) thought the main issue in psychology was conflating the ontological with the ontic level of analysis. He considers Daseinanalysis as a description of concrete existential experience on the level of ontic or regional anthropology (p. 125). Heidegger supported Boss's emphasis on "perceptive world openness" and human existence as the clearing or illumination of being. Each person's "world-relations" is an individual way of being human and open to the world. Psychotic patients form a blockage of their world-openness. Heidegger criticized psychoanalysis for settling for the scientific attitude, especially the Cartesian dichotomy of subject and object (p. 207). He thought that Freud failed to see the "clearing" and neglected the ontological characteristics of the being of man (p. 182), basing his theory on forces that reduce the person to urges and wishes:

Concealment is not the antithesis of consciousness but rather concealment belongs to the clearing. Freud simply did not see this clearing, otherwise, he would have succeeded in understanding the consciousness of children.

(p. 182)

Heidegger is saying that Freud's repression is a hiding, while concealment is a more basic existential structure. He would see psychiatry and psychoanalysis as ontic pursuits, legitimate in themselves, but not to be confused with ontology, the study of fundamental beings. In this view, any psychology is a study of essences and categories, derivatives of a more basic ontological study of Being (see below).

Hans Loewald

Hans Loewald (1906–1993) was a psychoanalyst and theorist born in the Alsace region of Germany (Downey 1994). His father, who died shortly after his birth, was a Jewish physician with an interest in dermatology and psychiatry; his mother was a gifted musician. After his father died, the family moved to Berlin, where he grew up in the care of his mother, aunt, and maternal grandparents. He was a graduate student in philosophy at Marburg (where Heidegger was teaching) and Freiburg between 1924 and 1926, just before the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927 (Loewald 1950). From 1924 to 1926,

when Loewald was his student, Heidegger gave lecture series on Aristotle, the concept of time, and the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as working out early drafts of *Sein und Zeit* (Kisiel 1993).

Since Heidegger did not move to Freiburg until 1928, it seems unlikely that Loewald followed Heidegger to Freiburg, as he started medical school in Tuebingen in 1926. It has oft been speculated that Loewald left his study with Heidegger because of his turn toward Nazism, but it is likely more complicated. Heidegger did not become officially a Nazi until 1933 and previously had had little interest in politics. Since we now know that Heidegger held antisemitic views, it is likely that Loewald understood this during his study with Heidegger. Moreover, one cannot go to medical school without preparatory science courses, so Loewald must have been planning this for some time. There is no record of his motivation for medicine, but he told colleagues that even before his break with Heidegger, he had been wary of philosophy's tendencies towards exclusions, otherworldliness, and a reason too abstracted from life. He continued medical training in Tuebingen, Freiburg (where he may or may not have had more contact with Heidegger), and Berlin between 1926 and 1932, then fled in 1933 to Bologna and then to Padua, taking a medical degree from Rome University in 1934. While in Italy, he married his first wife and practiced psychiatry in Italy until 1939. In 1939, with fascism growing in Italy, Loewald went to Paris, where he made an attempt to become a French citizen before moving with his family to the United States. He eventually lived and practiced in New Haven, Connecticut, and wrote a series of influential papers on the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

I knew Loewald when I became a candidate at the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1975, and he was assigned as my first supervisor. We worked together for seven years. Of interest was that in supervision, he spoke very little of his own theoretical concepts, focusing only on the basic concepts of transference and countertransference appropriate to my stage of learning. He was a private man, and I knew almost nothing about his private life. He apparently did not speak much about his philosophical experiences, and so we know little about his experience with Heidegger.

You would barely know from Loewald's collected writings that he had studied philosophy or was a student of Heidegger. Stan Leavy (personal communication), a personal friend of Loewald, reports that Loewald carried around a copy of *Sein Und Zeit* like a holy book. Leavy said of Loewald: "His attitude was Heideggerian in the sense of observing someone in their fullness, you must try to live in that fullness, that there is something more there that is going to reappear" (unpublished interview). I took part for a number of years with Stan Leavy and several academic philosophers in a study group on Continental philosophy, where we read *Being and Time* along with other works of Heidegger and his colleagues. At my request, this study group also read papers by Loewald and traced the Heideggerian influences in them. Leavy (1989) was the first to publish about Heidegger's influence on Loewald. This paper attempts to expand on Leavy's views and reflect on discussions in the study group.

I can find only three references to Heidegger in his published work; the first occurs in the introduction to Loewald's collected papers:

Philosophy has been my first love. I gladly affirm its influence on my way of thinking while being wary of the peculiar excesses a philosophical bent tends to entail.

My teacher in this field was Martin Heidegger, and I am deeply grateful for what I learned from him, despite his most hurtful betrayal in the Nazi era, which alienated me from him permanently.

(Loewald 1980, pp. viii–ix)

The present project aims to elucidate the influence of Heidegger on the themes in Loewald's psychoanalytic thinking by tracing Heideggerian ideas and themes that appear either directly or in parallel in Loewald's thinking. Since none of this is attributed by Loewald directly to Heidegger, we are left to make judgments. But Loewald is quite open to a debate with Freud, having great respect for Freudian concepts yet wanting to offer revisions, re-interpretations, and extensions. Important to Loewald was the idea that psychoanalysis, in his time, had grown stale. The dominant school of psychoanalysis was American ego psychology; the focus was the isolated ego, mechanistic concepts of drive and defense, and an austere, intellectual way of practice. Loewald wanted to re-vitalize psychoanalysis through a re-interpretation of classical Freudian concepts rather than the wholesale revision of language found in the various object-relations schools.

Sigmund Freud

Sigmund Freud was a Viennese medical doctor who, with several close colleagues, was the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud famously said: "Even when I have moved away from speculation, I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy" (1925, p. 59). This statement turns out to be misleading (Askay and Farquhar 2006; Tauber 2010). Freud named Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in particular as forerunners of psychoanalysis. It is clear that he was well versed in philosophy; he had considered a doctorate in philosophy at one point. He took six lecture courses from Brentano and was friendly with him.³ Brentano taught that there is no mental act without intending an object. The actual object of intentionality is a representation and is situated between the intending and the physical object. Freud adds that the intending is unconscious; drives require an object for discharge; and in narcissism, the ego has a libidinal investment in the narcissistic object. Melanie Klein (1946) takes the intentional object one step further by postulating that unconscious fantasy is always object-seeking. The Freudian ego derives from Descartes, who established that mental states form self-identity. Much of Freud's work is derived from Kant: the synthesizing ego, movement toward rationality, the mind as isolated, and consciousness as a unifying aspect in relation to experience. Nature, organized by cognition, constitutes experienced reality. Freud reportedly equated his idea of the unconscious with Kant's ideas of the thing-in-itself that is unknowable (Tauber 2010, p. 118). The question then becomes: what is the nature of the self? How can the self that knows also be part of the knowable world? Schopenhauer, in opposition to Kant, offers a universal will from which both subject and object differentiate. It is willing, not knowing, that is important; it allows a place for dreams and emotions. The task of philosophy is to inquire into the hidden and unknown. Freud himself commented that the will of Schopenhauer resembles his concept of the instincts. From Nietzsche, Freud borrows the Will to Power as a strife between competing instincts and the ability of the mind to self-deceive.

A Brief Introduction to Being and Time

Arendt (1971) characterizes Heidegger as a passionate thinker: “Heidegger never thinks “about” something; he thinks something”. He both penetrates to the depths but is content to stay there, laying down pathmarks⁴ constantly rethinking. In this sense, you can see why a psychoanalyst might be attracted to Heidegger, both live in the depths. Heidegger (1962) thinks that the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, since Plato, is dominated by a fascination with theory. This is the idea that you can understand the world by abstracting principles that underlie the multiplicity of visible phenomena, starting with Plato’s forms or Aristotelian concepts of substance. The dominant version of metaphysical theory in the modern era starts with Descartes’ division of self and object, leading to epistemological questions about what we can know. If all that we can be certain of is our own self, how can we be certain of other objects or other minds? But of course, this creates another problem that remains unsolved“ if the basic structure of being is subject and object, how do we bridge the gap between mind and body? Heidegger was not against theory, but he thought that theory was an abstraction from something even more fundamental, something that remains hidden in Western traditions.

Heidegger was trained in the neo-Kantian philosophy that dominated the German-speaking world from roughly 1870 until the First World War (Friedman 2000; Safranski 1998). Kant (1958) stands in the Cartesian tradition of the isolated cognito. He asks the question, squarely in the epistemological tradition: how can this cognito acquire knowledge of other objects? Is knowledge or true judgment about objects possible? Kant comes to the conclusion that objects of knowledge cannot be outside of our subjective judgments; the object is created or constituted in the mind when unconceptualized sensory data is organized by a priori structures of judgment – the categories of time and space. The neo-Kantians then argue about the details of the ideal realm of pure logic, one that is timeless and ahistorical, where value and meaning can be found. Arendt (1970) described the philosophical scene at the time as drowning in an ocean of boredom.

Dissatisfied with Kant’s use of pure logic, Heidegger turned to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1970). Phenomenology tries to find certainty in the different ways in which things present to consciousness. Husserl thinks that objects are always found in consciousness, what he calls intentionality. For example, in my consciousness, I see a cat. I see the cat from one angle, but I can imagine that cat from other angles. The cat is my cat; the cat is purring; the cat is hungry; the cat is frightened and hisses. I can recall other cats or see my friend’s cats. I remember other cats that I have had in the past. I can think of other types of cats, like a tiger, for example, that I saw in a zoo, and so on. I can also intend my cat with different subjective moods; I love my cat, I hate my cat when it wakes me up, I resent having to clean up the litter box, etc. The intended object is neither subjective nor objective; the traditional boundary between subject and object blurs and tends to disappear. The aim of phenomenology is to find a foundation – a firm ground for cognition – in a pre-perceptual unity. Yet, as Heidegger points out, there is still a transcendental ego set against objects, which he thinks is a false dichotomy.

Heidegger basically thought that philosophy had reached a dead end in the trajectory from Descartes through Kant and Husserl. The subject-object split that Descartes had

uncovered could not be healed. In the formalism of Kant and his successors, the person had disappeared. This is the study of ontology, the question of being. He thought that philosophy tended to take being for granted and did not investigate the structure of being. What is a person, what is God, an idea, a substance? Heidegger thought that all these categories were abstractions from something even more fundamental.

Heidegger (1962) states, "We should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being" (p. 19). What does Heidegger mean by Being (*Sein*)? It is not a thing or an entity, such as a chair, a depression, or even Martin. It is the primordial meaning that which makes beings in their concreteness possible. Heidegger calls this a pre-theoretical grasp of prior structures that make possible modes of being, what he calls "fundamental ontology" (p. 34).

In this everydayness there are certain structures...which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being.

(p. 38)

We might think of Being as the most basic condition to describe existence. Heidegger also speaks of an openness to Being that has been forgotten, "veiled in darkness" (p. 25) in the rush toward scientific theory, and can only be accessed through hermeneutic questioning; "it must be made transparent" (p. 24). *Fundamental ontology* is a search for what it is that unites and makes possible our varied and diverse senses of what it is to be.

Ontology traditionally asks, what is something? What are the facts? What is its category? Heidegger (1962) would have us ask, who is someone (p. 79)? In a new beginning, Heidegger wants to start with human existence, which he calls *Dasein* (p. 32). He starts with *Dasein's* uniqueness, that of being an inquisitive being. What is Being? We can say what Being is not. It is not a specific human being or a conscious subject. It is not the whatness of things. It is not a category, an entity, an essence, or a substance – all traditional descriptions of being. All of these are derivatives of Being, which Heidegger calls ontic. *Dasein*, rather, is the way of being characteristic of human beings. What is it to be *Dasein*? What is fundamental is existence:

That kind of being toward which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call existence.

(p. 32)

Dasein is uniquely defined as "being-in-the-world" (p. 78), to be seen as a whole and a priori. The world is not a container but what we are always immersed in, where we "reside" or "dwell in" (p. 80). Rather than the side-by-side characteristic of entities, we are "being alongside" the world, of being absorbed in the world (p. 80). What is the characteristic structure of *Dasein*? *Dasein* is inquisitive; it inquires about itself and asks about its Being. Secondly, human beings are always immersed in an activity that aims for an end. Being is always by its nature temporal (*zeitlich*) (p. 17), seeing itself as projecting into the future. Finally, *Dasein* is characterized by care (*Sorge*) (p. 84). Care is taking one's own being as a question, of finding an authentic way of Being, of absorption in activity, but it also includes attending to, taking care of something

(*Besorgen*), or actively caring for someone else, solicitude (*Fürsorge*). To know the truth is to care about it; the truth is what we allow ourselves to know. Here again, we have a connection to psychoanalysis, which shares this passion.

Let us return to my cat. My cat is attached to me, will follow me around the house, and does not like to be left alone. He wants to be fed, provided with a clean litter box, and wants to be petted (on his terms). But Heidegger would say that my cat does not have *Dasein*.⁵ For Heidegger would assume cats cannot self-reflect, do not have concern for others as other *Dasein*, do not plan for the future, and do not contemplate the limitations of time and existence.

Heidegger means to undercut mental activity, such as desiring or thinking, by a more fundamental practical activity or involvement that is pretheoretical. Then concepts, thinking, or categories are a secondary phenomenon, abstracted from activity and involvement.

Heidegger uses hammering as his prime example, but let us examine a psychoanalytic hour. When my patient arrives, we are usually both in a theoretical mode; we each might have a theory of the other, of her or my current motives, what happened in the last session, etc. All of these are ideas that maintain a distance between her and me. They may be useful as a starting point, but something is hidden. Heidegger calls this mode present-at-hand (*vorhandenheit*) (p. 67), a concern with what an object is, universal laws, categories, or theory. As my patient starts to talk, I begin to get drawn into her mental world, to be absorbed by it. Thinking about tends to be replaced by reacting to or being with. Both parties become immersed in the unconscious. A transferential field narrows the gap between subjects, a dialogue and a flow develop. Heidegger calls this readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) (p. 98). He notes that we do not encounter mere things, but rather we use the things at hand to get something done, what Heidegger calls equipment (*Zeug*) (p. 97). It is *Dasein's* active engagement and activity with objects that constitute authentic Being. In our patient hour, my task is to elucidate the unconscious motivations of my patient. Equipment might include the setting, the assurance of privacy, or my relative abstinence. Even what shows up in my mind, the countertransference, is a kind of equipment sometimes useful for the task. Equipment is defined not by its properties but by what it is used for, its place in a context of use, or what Heidegger calls manipulation (*handlichkeit*) (p. 98). Being-in-the-world (*In-der-welt-sein*) (pp. 78–86) then is a totality of involvements (p. 116) for acting in the world. We become absorbed in the project, what Heidegger calls circumspection (*umsicht*), a kind of looking around (p. 98). Moreover, being at work on something always entails being toward a purpose, a goal, or a project (p. 99).

Heidegger thinks that, in the experience of being ready-to-hand, we lose ourselves in the task and fail to notice it. It is only when something fails that we become aware of the activity. Let us say there is a miscommunication in the hour, the patient becomes angry or breaks off, and an impasse develops. There are three modes of breakdown: conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy (p. 104). When equipment temporarily malfunctions, we become conspicuous of the activity; the equipment stands out, a kind of unhandiness. Or something protrudes, stands in the way, is missing, or is obtrusive. We likely fall back on deliberation and conscious planning. We are forced to pay attention to the activity. In the hour, we focus on the impasse and find a new way of coping. If there is standing in the way, a total breakdown (obtrusiveness), or a prolonged impasse, we fall back on theoretical reflection and finally just resort to staring

at each other. We are back to present-at-hand and the awareness of isolated properties and substances. Arendt (1971) puts it thusly:

Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; one can perhaps learn to think.

The Dialogue among Heidegger, Freud, and Loewald

Use of Language

In reading *Being and Time*, we immediately encounter a strange philosophical language, both in the original German and in the English translation. There are hyphenations, unusual prefixes, uncommon suffixes, and redefining of ordinary German words, all to reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk. Vandevelde (2014) suggests that we can read Heidegger in two contradictory ways. We can read Heidegger as a kind of poet-philosopher who is trying, in his use of evocative words and novel phrasing, to recreate for us the experience of Being, or we can develop propositions to make Heidegger's ideas into a conceptual framework. In either case, Heidegger invents a whole new philosophical language.

Being, for example, is a basic concept in Western metaphysics, meaning permanent and unchanging reality, the substance or essence of what is. For Heidegger, Being (*sein*) must be differentiated from beings (*das seiende*). With beings, we can ask, what are they, what are they made of, and what is their constitution? But of man, we ask, who is man, how does he exist, and what are his modes of existence? *Dasein* is Heidegger's invented name for the distinctive mode of Being realized by human beings. *Dasein* is a combination of two German words: *da*, meaning there or here, present or available, and *sein*, meaning modes of being. *Dasein* in ordinary German is used for the being or life of a person. *Dasein* is not to be understood as the biological human being, nor is it to be understood as 'the person'. For Heidegger, *Dasein* "is distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it" (p. 32). *Dasein* "always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself, to be itself or not itself" (p. 33). The *Da* can be translated as 'open', the possibility of 'taking-as', a preintellectual openness to Being that is necessary for us to encounter beings as beings in a particular way.

Loewald, like Heidegger, wants to subvert the traditional language of psychoanalysis, but he is not interested in a new vocabulary; rather, he wants to redefine traditional Freudian concepts. He (1976) states:

I use metapsychological concepts, reformulating or reinterpreting some of them, and attempting to integrate them within a broader framework than that in which they first appeared.

(p. 148fn)

In another paper (1978b), Loewald states his opinion that many psychoanalytic concepts "are based on anxious clinging to unimaginative comprehension and to rigid

and unduly restrictive definitions of certain Freudian concepts and theoretical formulations" (pp. 191–192). "What psychoanalysis needs might not be a 'new language' but a less inhibited, less pedantic and narrow understanding and interpretation of its current language" (p. 193). In the phrase, 'anxious clinging', we can see an echo of Heidegger's inauthenticity, the clinging to the They. We might contrast Loewald with Melanie Klein, who invents a new psychoanalytic language, much closer in spirit to Heidegger. Concepts such as positions, projective identification, and unconscious fantasy have their roots in Freudian concepts but take on such added meaning as to be totally new.

An example of Loewald's creative use of psychoanalytic terms is found in his description of the Freudian instinct. Freud (1915a) speaks of an instinct as a 'stimulus' (p. 118) arising from within the mind and thus cannot be evaded. But then Freud calls an instinct "a psychical representation" (p. 112), which Loewald re-interprets as a force. The mind's work is not to discharge stimuli but to generate representations. With the formulation of the structural theory (Freud 1923), the mind is seen as an organism, and instincts are active and dynamic forces within that organism. Life and death instincts (Freud 1920) are now broad motivational forces, the tendency toward inertia and toward activity. Loewald (1971b) wants to reinterpret these broad motivational forces in a revolutionary formulation:

Instincts, understood as psychic, motivational, forces, become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit.

(pp. 127–128)

For Freud (1915a), an instinct is not originally connected to an object but becomes assigned to the instinct in terms of the ability to provide satisfaction. Loewald (1971b) reinterprets instinct and object as a developmental process:

In the mnemonic action pattern, urge and response, environmental engenderment, and the subject's excitation are not differentiated from each other.

(p. 131)

In Loewald's view, the mnemonic action pattern is not yet an instinct nor is it represented. Primary narcissism (Freud 1914a) is not a state of non-cathexis of the external world but rather an inability to distinguish the ego from the external world. Pleasure and unpleasure are global events. What we call instinct and object only gradually become differentiated out of the original undeveloped matrix of mother and child.

Another aspect of language is its evocatory aspect. Heidegger (1962) distinguishes between idle talk (*gerede*) and talk (*rede*). Idle talk or chatter is equated with gossiping, passing along, and scribbling (p. 212):

Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own.

(p. 213)

Idle talk is the manifestation of a groundless floating, a kind of protective shelter to remain in the They, a dead language. Talk is a living language, open to experience and to its own history and temporality:

The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself.

(p. 262)

Similarly, in the last section of his paper on language, Loewald (1978a) speaks of the “magical evocative” (pp. 199–200) quality of language, a sentence that could come straight out of Being and Time. Heidegger (1962) speaks of the call of consciousness (p. 317); it is an appeal to the self, lost in self-absorption, to be brought to itself, back to a more authentic being-in-the-world. This call is not formulated in words but is silent and “calls Dasein forth to its possibilities” (p. 319).

Loewald (1978a) uses a similar language. Words not only name things, but they “summon things and experiences, as bringing them to life” (p. 200). Words have the power of action, rendering them present. Loewald suggests that, in the development of civilization, much of this primordial power of words has been lost, only coming to the fore in great poetry and creative prose, echoing Heidegger’s lifelong interest in poetry. It is in this distinction that Loewald discusses secondary and primary process. Primary process are those forms of mentation that promote non-differentiation and oneness, what Loewald calls the primordial density, while secondary process are those forms of mentation that promote differentiation, self and object formation, duality, and multiplicity. In the move to secondary process, there is a danger of losing a connection between the thing-presentation, the “first and true object-cathexes” (pp. 184–185), and the word-presentation, losing its “original unity” (p. 187), similar to Heidegger’s contrast between idle talk and authenticity.

Deconstruction

Heidegger (1962) holds that:

The meaning of Being is one that has not been attended to and one that has been inadequately formulated, but that it has been quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in ‘metaphysics’.

(p. 43)

What he means is that Being has been taken as a grounding concept and something self-evident. It is this tradition, in Heidegger’s view, that needs to be destroyed (*De-strucktion*⁶). Metaphysics has become sterile and desolate. He asks, “What is Being?” (BT 6:49), and he answers that Being must be disclosed from its concealment. *Dasein*, the human version of Being, in the ordinary world, is hidden:

The ‘they’ has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of Being.

(p. 312)

The They (*Mann*) means measuring or submerging oneself according to others, the crowd, or the tradition; it is a sign of inauthenticity. The authentic truth remains hidden:

Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factual uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of robbery.

(p. 265)

Being must be uncovered or disclosed from its everyday absorption. Being ordinarily is “tranquillized” (p. 239) or “addicted” (p. 240). What must be destroyed, then, is the inauthentic tradition, which blocks *Dasein* from accessing the primordial aspects of Being. But deconstruction is not just a negative move; it opens up possibilities. If *Dasein* can grasp its historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), its temporality, it:

Becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence...going back into the possibilities of the *Dasein* that has-been-there.

(p. 437)

Here, repeating (*wiederholen*) means an attempt to retrieve former possibilities, and it becomes “a moment of vision” (p. 438) and opens up the possibilities of the future.

Loewald, I think, has a different kind of deconstruction in mind. In his dialogue with Freud, his wish is not to destroy but to reform. The impulse is to find new life in concepts that have become stale and overly abstract, much as Heidegger viewed the metaphysical tradition. Let us take the ego as an example. Loewald (1951) here is in dialogue with Freud (1923) and his conception of the ego as a “repressive, defensive agency” (p. 3), a compromise between the demands of the id and the outer world. Outer reality is essentially seen as hostile and threatening – an outside force. Further, Freud tends to personify the father as this outside force. The father is the great castrator, the figure who threatens the boy for his connection to his mother, who reminds the boy that his penis is too small and unsatisfying, and who forms a boundary between masculine and feminine. It is not that Loewald disagrees with this formulation, but he sees a competing reality, drawn from Freud’s (1914a) study of narcissism. There is another reality, that of primary narcissism, in which “reality is not outside, but is contained in the pre-ego of primary narcissism” (p. 8).

It is an undifferentiated phase in which the infant and its world are still one, are only beginning to differentiate from one another, which means also that the differentiation of the psychic apparatus itself into its structural elements still is dormant.

(p. 10)

Loewald calls this “a unitary whole” (p. 11).

Loewald (1952) suggests that psychoanalysis has “understood unquestioningly” (p. 30) a view of reality as “a hostile-defensive ego reality” (p. 30), making it the dominant objective reality. In this “defensive-reactive process” (p. 31), fantasy is split off and leads to an impoverishment of the ego. Is this a parallel to Heidegger, where impoverishment is a product of inauthenticity?

While Loewald's project differs from Heidegger's in its aim and meaning, I believe he has been profoundly influenced by Heidegger's hermeneutics. Traditional psychoanalysis emphasizes a foundational belief, a vertical picture of human knowledge that posits a descending degree of justified beliefs down to core or foundational beliefs. In this sense, Freudian interpretation is the search for a primal meaning, a restoration of meaning, and a reduction of illusion (Ricoeur 1970). Freud (1937b) described the "work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist's excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice" (p. 259). The assumption is that analysis can, in principle, uncover a true, justified belief about original trauma.

Loewald (1960) reinterprets the archeological simile as picturing the deeper layers of the id cut off from present reality and influence:

It is as though the functional relationship between the deeper strata of an excavation and their external environment were denied because these deeper strata are not in a functional relationship with the present-day environment; as though it were maintained that the architectural structures of deeper, earlier strata are due to purely 'internal' processes, in contrast to the functional interrelatedness between present architectural structures (higher, later strata) and the external environment that we see and live in.

(p. 232)

Both Heidegger and Loewald aim to uncover what is hidden – Being or the primal ego, respectively. What is recovered for Loewald (1960) is not primarily a set of unconscious fantasies but the resumption of "ego development" (p. 221). He calls ego development "a process of increasingly higher integration and differentiation of the psychic apparatus" (p. 224). To promote ego growth, the analyst makes himself available as "a new 'object-relationship' between the patient and the analyst" (p. 224). Loewald calls this "a new discovery of objects" (p. 225), to emphasize a new look at old objects. The new object could be understood as seeing the analyst in a new way, but also as the opening up of new possibilities: "the newness consists in the patient's rediscovery of the early paths of the development of object-relations leading to a new way of relating to objects and of being oneself" (p. 229). While Loewald recognizes a mirror aspect of transference, he holds that the analyst has a vision of the "true form" (p. 226) or "the emerging core" (p. 229), "always from the viewpoint of potential growth" (p. 230). This is what the analyst holds and contains for the patient – a vision of what he can become. This is an aspect of identification between patient and analyst, but not of what is or what has been, but of what can become. What does Loewald mean by integration and differentiation? He emphasizes understanding of both conscious and unconscious material, of greater mastery, of putting into words, of overcoming a differential, and of lifting the unconscious into the preconscious. Part of what the analyst does is promote a "true regression" (p. 240) to open up "freer interplay between the unconscious and preconscious systems" (p. 240). To do this, the analyst "must be able to regress within himself to the level of organization on which the patient is stuck" (pp. 241–242).

Being in the World

As Heidegger does, I will start with Aristotle (1984). In his *Physics*, he divided things into two general categories: artifacts, which require an external principle of change – a house built by a builder – and natural things, which have an internal principle of change – an oak that grows from an acorn. The acorn represents the potentiality of the form, while the mature tree is its actuality. Form can exist at various levels of potentiality and actuality; there are various intermediate forms between the acorn and the mature tree. Creation consists of the imposition of form on matter. Here we have a developmental force which impels the thing toward its realization of its form. The form is a powerful and dynamic force for the realization of structure. *Entelecheia* means continuing in a state of completeness, or being at an end which is of such a nature that it is only possible to be there by means of the continual expenditure of the effort required to stay there. It is the activity that makes a thing what it is; *entelecheia* extends to *energeia* because it is the end or perfection which has been achieved only in, through, and during activity.⁷ But Heidegger is adding something to *entelecheia*. The acorn's potential is only to become an oak tree, but *Dasein* has the existential potential to choose its own projects and can project possibilities into the future.

To signify movement in this Aristotelian sense, Heidegger (1962) introduces the German word “*Bewegtheit*” (p. 224), variously translated into English as “movement”, “movedness”, and “motility”. In Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, *Bewegtheit* is not something that happens to being; it is constitutive of being, what Heidegger calls “bringing forth” or “coming to presence”. He interprets Aristotle's term “*entelechy*” to signify the moment in which movement gathers itself together and comes to rest in the fully realized product. Heidegger's point is that things cannot be understood as a subject of knowledge but rather as interpretations in terms of meaning and use.

Loewald's dialogue is with Freud, yet his model of psychoanalysis is profoundly influenced by being-in-the-world. He examines two models of psychoanalysis that Freud proposes (Loewald 1971b). The first model is a closed system, describing the mind as a mental apparatus (Freud 1900). The nervous system is an apparatus which functions to get rid of or reduce stimuli to their lowest levels. “The mind is an instrument – however complex – that processes incoming stimuli to discharge them again in some modified form” (p. 120). The mind works on instinctual forces by forming mental representations of biological stimuli, what Loewald (1971b) thinks of “as the most primitive element or unit of motivation” (p. 119). Loewald counters Freud in thinking that:

the basic postulate concerning the general function of the psychic apparatus is no longer that of getting rid of the (organismic) stimuli that reach it, but that of generating mental representations of these stimuli.

(p. 119)

The introduction of the structural model (Freud 1923) is an advance on the psychic apparatus. The ego can now be understood as a set of personal motivation structures, “an interplay of psychic forces and structural layers” (p. 121). The mind “is embedded in its environment in such a way that it is in living contact and interchange with it; it modulates and influences the environment by its own activities, and its activity is modulated and influenced by the environment” (pp. 119–120).

Loewald proposes a third model, an interactive model, where instincts are now conceived as broad polar forces or urges of living matter. Fogel (1989) suggests that internalization is the central concept for Loewald (1973):

Internalization...is conceived as the basic way of functioning of the psyche, not as one of its functions.

(p. 71)

By internalization, a movement from outside to inside, Loewald does not mean the taking in of objects under threat of loss, as it does for Freud, as in an internal schema or map. He thinks of internalization as a growth process, an acceptance of the external world, and an enrichment of the ego.

In internalization, in contrast, the ego opens itself up, as it were, loosens its current organization to allow for its own further growth.

(p. 75)

The external world is assimilated; objects are destroyed and reincorporated into the ego structure. For Loewald, ego growth through internalization is opposed to repressive forces, which aim to inhibit growth and maintain infantile forms of functioning.

In internalization it is a matter of transforming these relationships into an internalized, intrapsychic, depersonalized relationship, thus increasing and enriching psychic structure: the identity with the object is renounced.

(p. 83)

But internalization is not a one-way process. Human life is inseparably embedded in a matrix of object-relations. As the ego grows through internalization processes, so are objects constituted and grow in complexity.

What about inside and outside? How might the coherent ego influence external relations? This is not well developed in Loewald's thinking, but we might turn to his use of projection (Loewald 1988a), not merely defensive but a recognition of the call of unconscious forces located in the external world, "acknowledging live, driving forces beyond and encompassing those operating in individual existence" (p. 53). For Loewald, projections are called or summoned by the unconscious of others, much as Heidegger thinks of *Dasein* as being summoned into existence. Loewald is suggesting movement toward individuation/internalization and the connectedness found in the "transindividual matrix" (p. 51) of mother-child unity.

Perhaps another indication of inside to outside is found in Loewald's (1986) discussion of transference/countertransference where he explicitly states that the patient and analyst have equal and symmetrical transferences to each other. Then, he states, "countertransference, in this general sense, is a technical term for the analyst's responsiveness to the patient's love-hate for the analyst" (p. 286). This responsiveness, this need for love and dependency with our objects, is what draws out the patient's projections.

Instincts originally are the same as the life of the body, only becoming separate as the organism becomes more differentiated. The ego is always "a constellation or

field of motivational activity composed of two centers of such activity” (Loewald 1971b, p. 105). Loewald reinterprets Freud’s (1914a) concept of primary narcissism as a manifestation of the interactions within the mother-child psychic field. Instincts and objects become gradually constituted within that field through differentiation and integration. Instinct and object both contribute to the organization of the other. “Satisfaction is a creative process in which appropriate environmental activity...engenders and organizes excitation processes” (p. 130). Instincts, in this sense, only come into being in psychic growth. In this sense, psychic structure formation is dependent on object-relations, established by way of internalizations and externalizations in which both mother and child participate (Loewald 1973).

In another formulation, Loewald (1988b) describes sublimation as “passion transformed” (p. 9). By this, he means that in the process of differentiation out of an original unity, a symbolic linkage remains of the original instinctual charge:

The elements we call instinctual and deinstinctualized each acquire a measure of autonomy without losing the other.

(p. 13)

He goes on to suggest a vast reciprocal play between the development of objects and ego out of primary narcissism, what Freud called object libido, and the internalization of external objects back into the unity of the ego, what Freud called narcissistic libido. This internal binding Freud (1923) called “desexualized Eros” (p. 44). Loewald (1988b) states:

Sublimation, in this view, involves an internal re-creative turn toward that matrix, a reconciliation of the polarized elements produced by individuation and, one may suspect, by sexual differentiation...it brings external and material reality within the compass of psychic reality, and psychic reality within the sweep of external reality.

(pp. 21–22)

This is a version of being-in-the-world; the self is connected to the world by internal loving connections; the self reaches out to the world through object connections, while at the same time, taking the world into itself through internalizations. Loewald believes in non-climactic satisfactions that could be described as sublimatory in various intimate relationships, in play, and in creativity, which he calls “reconciliation” (p. 33).

Death

The concept of death is central to Heidegger’s (1962) philosophy. By death, he does not mean “coming-to-an-end” (p. 286), an individual death. Rather, he means a way to be (*Zorn*):

Death is something that stands before us – something impending.

(p. 294)

The realization of the death of the subject brings *Dasein* to face its own “uncanniness” (*unheimlichkeit*) (p. 233) and opens up the possibility of an authentic existence (*eigentlich*). In “the basic state of mind of anxiety” (*angst*) (pp. 228–235), something vague and shadowing, *Dasein* is forced to confront Being. It takes away any standing outside or the familiar. The other mood for Heidegger is boredom (*Langeweile*), which he takes up at length in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (Heidegger 1995). Boredom, in its first form, is “Being bored with” (p. 113), where time drags. But profound boredom, with its emptiness, discloses a fundamental temporality of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, moods, in both cases, are not subjective states in an objectively given world but rather are aspects of what it means to be in a world. Death is a possibility of Being that we constantly flee from. Death is not something chosen by us, we are thrown into it.

Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one’s own demise...it amounts to the disclosure of the fact that *Dasein* exists as thrown Being toward its end.

(p. 295)

Heidegger thinks of the awareness of death as a release from illusions, as “an impassioned freedom toward death” (p. 311).

Loewald (1972b) has a dialogue with Freud about the death instinct. He notes that Freud’s original conception of the death instinct (1923, 1924, 1937a) emphasized aggression turned inward and a punishing sense of guilt, what Loewald calls “a deep-seated unconscious resistance” (p. 316). But for Loewald, this represents an upward interpretation of a phenomenon far less structured. He is pointing to aggression that arises before instincts become organized in the matrix of very early mother-infant interactions:

But in severe cases such an imbalance [between eros and Thanatos] is rooted in problems of early psychic development, in the precursors of morality, conscience, and guilt that antedate the Oedipus complex and the formation of the super-ego – where destructive forces got out of hand, as it were, and affected the very fiber of the person before it could be bound.

(p. 320)

The death drive, in this formulation, is not yet instinctual but results from “tensions within the mother-child matrix” (p. 321) and reflects an in-balance between destructive and creative tendencies. Loewald is speaking of death as something primal to be faced in all of us; we do have a parallel conceptualization with Heidegger’s view of death as the possibility of Being.

Authenticity

Heidegger’s existentialism comes from Friedrich Nietzsche (1956) and Søren Kierkegaard (1941). To be meaningful is to reject conventional morality or to take a leap of faith to truly become what I already am. Heidegger was also influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey (1996) who conceived of the subject as a living person with a history in need of interpretation. I believe that, like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Heidegger wanted

to rescue philosophy from its formalism and find its passion and humanity, what he called authenticity, yet at the same time not reject metaphysical structure.

For Heidegger, authenticity (*eigentlich*) and inauthenticity (*uneigentlich*) are two modes of Being (p. 68). Inauthenticity is not a lessor mode; rather, it is one way of existing – what Heidegger calls falling-in-the-world – a groundless and nullity. It is *Dasein* in its everydayness, characterized by hustle and tranquillization; it drifts along toward an alienation (*Entfremdung*) (p. 222). It is lost in the ‘They’. Heidegger thinks of this as looking away from a realization of finitude:

Dasein is proximally and for the most part lost in that which it concerns itself. In this lostness, however, Dasein’s fleeing in the face of authentic existence which has been characterized an ‘anticipatory resoluteness’, has made itself known; and this is a fleeing which covers up. In this concerned fleeing lies a fleeing in the face of death – that is, a looking away from the end of Being-in-the-world.

(p. 477)

Moods (*stimmung*), for Heidegger, are fundamental states of attunement (pp. 172–179). Most moods are found in everyday *Dasein*, happiness, irritation, and sadness – and do not provide any existential awareness. They accompany an inauthentic existence. It is anxiety (*angst*), the attunement to nothingness which is at the heart of *Dasein*. Heidegger differentiates fear from anxiety. Fear is inauthentic (p. 391), a “bewildered making-present” (p. 392). But the mood of anxiety discloses, confronts, and reveals this nothingness. Anxiety is not a fear but rather a dread of the awareness of death and finitude. In anxiety, there is a breakdown, resulting in a state of confusion and a loss of the everyday comfort of inauthentic existence. It is an uncanny awareness of not being at home. But this allows *Dasein* to make a claim of authentic existence, of being face to face with its personal being-in-the-world.

Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence.

(p. 310)

Anxiety “merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution” (p. 394). *Dasein* must choose itself authentically or not, actively taking on the responsibility of its death and the nothingness of its current existence. This is the meaning of resoluteness (*entschlossenheit*), which accepts this anxiety and can act without fear of it:

Anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which “count for nothing”, and lets him become free for those which are authentic.

(p. 395)

The essence of *Dasein* is a basic having-to-be-open to our primordial connectedness, an understanding and fascination with the world, providing, looking after, foreseeing, and awareness of the time horizon. The experience of anxiety leaves *Dasein* homeless

and unguarded, exposed to authentic Being as standing out against the background of nothingness. The experience of nothingness is a shock, but this may allow a focus on something creative. Anxiety reveals that everyday life is fleeing from Being. Nothing changes, only our attitude towards it. Care (*sorge*) is a basic characteristic of the human condition (pp. 227, 235–246), an orientation toward its world in a totality of practical involvement and projects. Care means providing, looking after, foreseeing, and being aware of the time horizon. It is a basic having-to-be-open to our primordial connectedness, an understanding and fascination with the world. In care, the world is disclosed to us as “Being-uncovered” (p. 261). The existential structures of care are disposedness, thrownness, projection, fallenness, and understanding (p. 264). Disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) can be translated as a state of mind, a receptivity. Richardson (2003) renders *Befindlichkeit* as ‘already-having-found-onself-there-ness’. Thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) is an acceptance of the world we have not chosen and end up in. Falling is the state of being lost in the world. Projection is not conscious planning, nor is it the wish to get rid of undesirable parts of the self; projection “has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out” (p. 185). Rather, projection is being aware of possibilities and having an understanding of the freedom to choose.

Loewald (1978b), in a lecture given at Yale University, spoke of Man as Moral Agent. The process of mental growth means an assumption of taking responsibility for oneself. This means taking responsibility for one’s own history, by which he means both “the history that has been lived and the history in the making” (p. 11). This responsibility is to transform raw experience into meaningful contexts at higher levels of organization, which Loewald conceptualizes as an ego function. Yet the opposite is also true. The ego can become rigid and frozen, “an unyielding rationality” (p. 16), and needs to rediscover its links to the unconscious. Loewald draws this from Freud’s (1933) statement: “where id was, there ego shall be” (p. 80) Loewald’s translates *werden* as to come into being. He is emphasizing the potentiality of id processes to evolve into ego organization. Unconscious levels of functioning can be appropriated as potentially me, as ego. Loewald calls this an existential task. It is here that Loewald (1978b) cites Heidegger⁸:

Heidegger’s concept of *Geworfenheit* – man is thrown into the world, unplanned and unintended by himself – and *Entwerfen* – the taking over and actively developing the potentialities of this fact – have grown in the same soil.

(p. 19)

Loewald goes on to make clear (in a footnote) that the factuality of human existence in Heidegger’s sense has a different dimension than the psychological meaning for Loewald, but what is in common is the dictum: “become what you are” (p. 19). Loewald calls the superego “the representative of futurity” (p. 23). “It represents the care and concern we have for ourselves, in past and present, as continuing on into a future that is to be shaped” (p. 23).

Likewise, Loewald’s (1960) idea of a true regression contains a version of the search for authenticity. He has a vision of ego development, a dynamic organization consisting of internalizations of increasing higher integration and differentiation between the infant and important objects in his environment. He calls this “synthetic ego

activities" (p. 228). Ego growth is promoted by one or more parents who both understand the child's current development and hold a vision of the child's future and mediate this vision to the child, "always from the viewpoint of the future" (p. 230). Needs are beyond the ability of the infant:

The understanding recognition of the infant's need on the part of the mother represents a gathering together of as yet undifferentiated urges of the infant, urges that in the acts of recognition and fulfillment by the mother undergo a first organization into some directed drive.

(p. 237)

These interactions are a mutual responsiveness in which both drive the direction and organization of the environment happen simultaneously. The analyst, like the mother, "operates as a representative of a higher stage of organization" (p. 239). Loewald uses the metaphor of "per via de levare"⁹ (p. 226), as in sculpture, "chiselling away the transference distortions" (p. 225) to bring out the "true form" (p. 226).¹⁰ There is a circularity of interpretation in the reciprocity of chiseling away and revealing, aiming at a "new object-relationship" (p. 226). Interpretation "makes available" (p. 240) previous unconscious material, through steps toward a "true level of regression" (p. 242), promoted by the analyst's interpretation of defense and the analyst's ability to regress to the same organizational level of the patient, "whereby the preconscious regains its originality and intensity" (p. 240). The analyst:

reveals himself to the patient as a more mature person, as a person who can feel with the patient what the patient experiences and how he experiences it, and who understands it as something more than it has been for the patient.

(p. 243)

Then, in a further move, Loewald thinks that psychic growth is not just an interaction between psychic apparatus and the object-world but an interplay between unconscious and preconscious intensities. It is these unconscious intensities that give current experiences their full meaning and emotional depth. This is the meaning of Loewald's well-known evocation of Odysseus's journey to the underworld, where ancestor-ghosts need to taste blood in order to reawaken to life and be released from their ghost life.

Loewald (1951) has a biphasic view of anxiety. In one of his few references to Heidegger, Loewald (1953) notes that Heidegger sees anxiety as an "expression of nothingness, of man's possibility of finding himself unrelated, confronted with 'the abyss of naught'" (p. 3),¹¹ which Loewald sees as parallel to Freud's use of anxiety as the threat of loss of love, another kind of nothingness. Loewald goes on, in Heideggerian fashion, to equate the experience of anxiety with the call for freedom. Once the ego and the instincts become structuralized by integrated processes, conflict, signal anxiety, and defense become aspects of the mind:

Defense, in the sense in which we speak of it in neurosis, and therefore to a certain degree in normal development, is based on that stage in the development of individual-environment configuration, of ego-reality integration, in which an organized ego and organized reality have been differentiated from each other.

What I mean here by organized reality may be indicated by saying that it implies (among other things) the establishment of distinct, libidinally invested (parental) figures mutually related to each other and the ego, such as they come into being in the development of the Oedipus situation. Only then is a stage in the constitution of ego and of reality reached in which a defense struggle between an ego and an 'external' object-world and the resulting defense against id impulses can occur.
(p. 25)

Repression, for Loewald (1952), is opposed to internalization, a kind of anti-growth, a lack of authenticity. Projective identification and introjective processes of "a narcissistic and magical" (p. 26) character predominate in pre-Oedipal development. Quoting Karen Horney (1932), Loewald (1951) proposes a male "dread of the vulva" (p. 13), a "fear of...being drowned, sucked in, overpowered" (p. 13). Loewald calls it "an unstructured nothingness of identity" (p. 16), a regression to a loss of boundaries between ego and objects. It is here that we see a hint of Heidegger in characterizing early development as a state of nothingness and equating repression with a loss of authenticity.

For Loewald (1962b), emptiness and loneliness are examined in the context of object loss through separation or death. If the loss cannot be mourned and internalized, then either the loss or its significance can be denied, a substitute must be found, or depression results. Mourning is a process of acknowledging the loss, examining in detail its pain, and relinquishing external objects. But at the same time, we internalize aspects of the lost object and incorporate these aspects into ourselves. Internalization is meant to abolish the pain of separation and loss. But in considering early development, where there is "no difference exists between the 'I' and the 'not-I'" (p. 265), such loss and frustration are "boundary-creating processes" (p. 266) establishing externality and internality. There is then always a tension between wanting to return to the security of mother-child unity and the mastery and freedom of separation, which for Loewald is exemplified in the ego ideal:

The ego ideal, in contrast to the child's frequent experiences of an impotent, helpless ego, is then a return, in fantasy to the original state; it is an ego replenished, restored to the wholeness of the undifferentiated state of primary narcissism.
(p. 268)

It is the establishment of a secure inner world of objects that provides security to withstand adult external losses. Further, in adult life, the intensity of unconscious processes and access to primary process experiences need to have an interplay with more conscious and rational experiences (Loewald 1960). If this linkage is severed due to repression or splitting, then a defensive isolation results; "human life becomes sterile and an empty shell" (p. 250), leading to an excessive reliance on external objects for security. Might this be Loewald's reply to Heidegger's deflection to the Nazis, a wish to return symbolically to the unity of primary narcissism?

Time

Heidegger (1962) differentiates between the ordinary conception of time and primordial time. Ordinary time is duration – my hour is 50 minutes; a measurement – this pill

is 20 mg; it is earlier or later – I will see you later in the afternoon. Clock time is what is counted (pp. 472–480). In this view, time is an endless sequence of nows – it comes into being and passes away – as an uninterrupted sequence; it has no beginning and no end.

What Heidegger calls primordial time is what underlies and makes possible ordinary time:

Temporality is the primordial ‘outside’ of itself (p. 377).

Dasein is always situated in a place and a time. Temporality is one of the determining properties of *Dasein*; it is always situated in its personal history, finding its meaning in time. Heidegger does not mean a personal history of one person, but that history defines being and its possibilities. What we need to grasp in its primordial temporality is finitude – that *Dasein*’s life is limited. We are thrown into a world not of our choosing, and we die. This being-toward-death is usually evaded by fleeing into idle talk and ordinariness. We can only uncover primordial time by authentically facing death and its finitude. *Dasein* projects “ahead-of-itself” (p. 386) to the possibilities of its existence and lays hold of the way its past lives on as “having-been” (p. 373) within the present. *Dasein*’s nature is to project, not in the psychoanalytic way of putting one thing into another, but that its very character is one of having possibilities and projects. Thus, time is “stretched” (p. 425) within this threefold model. Being-toward-death then discloses possibility (pp. 304–311). Heidegger means the potential of opening up – what he calls the openness of the clearing, a moment of vision (p. 463). Then, in a second move, we return to the things encountered to make them meaningful in the present. What is disclosed is anticipatory resoluteness (pp. 370–380), a kind of opening up to “being oneself, an impassioned freedom toward death – a freedom that has been released” (p. 311). It is “the working out of possibilities projected in understanding” (p. 189). This allows “for a freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself” (p. 232).

What is Heidegger saying here? If we can authentically accept our finitude as human beings, if we truly understand that our time is limited, that can free us up to our inner potential. The determinism of the past can be balanced by an orientation toward projects and possibilities. Inauthentic existence means to be “lost in the They” (p. 313). Authenticity can be claimed by a call of conscience (p. 314), a “summoning to its innermost Being-guilty” (p. 314). Guilt is being lost in the They. For Heidegger, being guilty means “being responsible for” (p. 327). Then conscience is a summoning of *Dasein* toward this potentiality-for-being, which alone is the issue; it “is a call for care” (p. 322).

Heidegger sums up the following:

Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking and taking things lightly—and brings *Dasein* to the simplicity of its fate. This is how we designate *Dasein*’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which *Dasein* hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.

(p. 435)

Loewald states (1972a) that in the early years of psychoanalytic thought, the past was seen as an absolute determinism where unconscious forces from the past controlled and determined our present behavior. Unacceptable impulses are repressed (Freud 1915b) and forgotten, then return as substitute formations or are repeated in action

(Freud 1914b). Finally, Freud (1920) found a compulsion to repeat that accompanied trauma and overrode any pleasure. In a dialogue with Freud, Loewald notes that there is a dialogue between past and present modes of time. The psychic past is activated in the psychic present by transference. But the psychic present also impacts the psychic past. Reminiscences, Freud's (1893) term for immature memory traces, pull the psychic present back to reenactment (hypnoid states) (Loewald 1955). In Freud's concept of *nachträglichkeit*, the past is constantly reworked by more mature understandings in the present. Leavy (1989) suggests that for Loewald:

our "thrownness" is better conceived as one into a world that is prior to defense. Not only the infant lives in this unitary world; the parents also, especially the mother, have the wherewithal, the persisting capacity, to "regress" to the infantile level sufficiently to be one with the child. Interaction with the environment at this stage is not defensive.

(p. 236)

Loewald's (1955, 1960, 1962a, 1971a, 1972a) adds to Freud's vision of psychoanalysis in the interrelatedness of the three modes of time – past, present, and future. Almost alone among classical analysts, Loewald highlights the future mode of time. "The superego functions from the viewpoint of a future ego" (Loewald 1962a, p. 45), to what we might be, or should be, "potentialities that we envisage for ourselves or of which we despair" (p. 46). Loewald postulates three successive stages in superego development. First is the stage of ideal ego, a magical return to the original state of perfection, a state of unity with the environment. Gradually, an ego ideal forms where the future state is "attained by merging with the magical object" (p. 47), leaving it dependent on external structures to have any claim. In the superego proper, the "ego envisages an inner future of itself" (p. 47) "in terms of psychic time, the relationship between ego and superego can be seen as a mutual relation between psychic present and psychic future" (p. 52).

Conscience for Loewald (1960) is a call from the future:

Only insofar as we are ahead of ourselves, insofar as we recognize potentialities in ourselves, which represent more than we are at present and from which we look back at ourselves as we are at present, can we be said to have a conscience.

(p. 273)

In his paper on memory, Loewald (1976) speaks of the human being as an "historical being" (p. 171):

In such memorial activity, which weaves past, present, and future into a context of heightened meaning, each of us is on the pathway to becoming a self.

(p. 172)

In his paper on internalization, Loewald (1973) speaks of:

Inner ideals, expectations, hopes, demands, and, equally, inner doubts, fears, guilt, despair concerning oneself – all this is reaching toward or feeling defeated by a future.

(p. 273)

The voice of conscience tells us what we should do or should have done, speaking from a future that we ask ourselves to reach or tell ourselves we are failing to reach – perhaps a future which should bring back a lost past, but certainly a future whose image in the course of development becomes imbued with all that is still alive from the hopes, expectations, demands, promises, ideals, aspirations, self-doubt, guilt, and despair of past ages, ancestors, parents, teachers, prophets, priests, gods, and heroes.

The superego, inasmuch as it is the internal representative of parental and cultural standards, expectations, fears, and hopes, is the intrapsychic representation of the future... The voice of conscience speaks to us as the mouthpiece of the superego, from the point of view of the inner future which we envision.

(p. 273)

This echoes Heidegger's (1962a) call for the unity of past, present, and future as the potential for *Dasein*.

The Body

It is a common criticism that Heidegger neglected to say much about the body (Aho 2013; Dreyfus 1991; Li 2015). He makes the distinction between ontological, by which he means the basic structures of *Dasein*, and ontic, which is the regional manifestation of *Dasein* in practical activities. The care structure, authenticity, categories of time, aspects of thrownness, and death are all ontological categories to describe the structure of *Dasein* being in the world. The body, for Heidegger (1962), is an ontic category, something present at hand and not a primary constituent of existence. He thinks it is a mistake to reduce *Dasein* to a merely physical being rather than a being with a particular relationship to being:

...the perverse assumption that the entity in question has at bottom the kind of Being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from attributing to it the solidarity of a occurrent corporeal Thing.

(BT 25:153)

Perhaps Heidegger fears that reducing *Dasein* to a merely biological being would be to situate *Dasein* in the present as a biological system determined by its physical characteristics, being present-at-hand, rather than its orientation toward future prospects. The rebuttal to this absence is found in Merleau-Ponty (2014), who asks, how can we discuss ready-to-hand without involving the body? Is not the body to be equally disclosed in *Dasein's* involvements? *Dasein* always has a body, and it is not a separate structure in its world. We can make a similar analysis of involvement with our bodies and its disruption in illness and pain.

Heidegger (2001) participated for many years in a yearly seminar with Swiss psychiatrists organized by Menard Boss and L Binswanger, published as the *Zollikon Seminars*, three decades or more after the publication of *Being and Time*. It is evident in the book that the group pushed Heidegger about his stance on the body, and, to my reading, he is quite evasive and doesn't really answer. He does try to answer such criticism by making the distinction between the lived body (*Lieb*) and the corporal

body (*Körper*). In my lived body, I am already “bodying-forth” (*Leiben*) (p. 86) in my pretheoretical state:

How does the body participate in this assertion? The body participates by hearing and seeing. But does the body see? No. I see. But certainly my eyes belong to such a seeing, and thus to my body...I see through my eyes.

(p. 88)

Loewald would not likely have had access to the *Zollikon* lectures and thus would be left with Heidegger’s exclusion of bodily functions.

Conclusion

Martin Heidegger was Hans Loewald’s teacher in Germany from 1924 to 1926. Loewald does acknowledge his profound gratitude to Heidegger but cannot forgive him for his antisemitic betrayal. I have tried to convey that Loewald’s psychoanalytic conceptions result from two profound influences: Loewald has a conscious dialogue with Freud in an effort to evolve Freudian concepts into modern usage, while he has a hidden and unconscious dialogue with Heidegger in translating concepts of Being into psychoanalytic terms. While Heidegger wants to battle traditional metaphysics by destruction and replacement, laying the groundwork for modern attempts at deconstruction, Loewald is more of a “quiet revolutionary” (Fogel et al. 1996), profoundly altering Freudian language but not inventing new vocabulary. Both Heidegger and Loewald feel their respective fields are deadened by a sterile use of language. Loewald feels that words could lose their “magical evocative” power if the link between conscious and unconscious mentation is lost. Loewald is, by personality, not a Klein or Lacan who wants to overturn the Freudian enterprise. I would hold that Heideggerian concepts, such as being-in-the-world, authenticity, death, and time, permeate Loewaldian thinking. Being-in-the-world is a subversion of the traditional distinction between subject and object, actually coming from a variety of sources, not just Heidegger. For example, the relational sense of being embedded in the world can be traced back to Ferenczi (Wolstein 1997). Heidegger characterizes Being as inseparable from its place in the world. Loewald similarly characterizes self and object as differentiating from the original unity of a mother-child matrix. For Loewald, instincts and defenses, indeed all mental structures, are originally global events which only evolve out of this unity. In Heidegger’s view, the authenticity of *Dasein*, the human form of Being, is predicated upon its acceptance of thrownness, finitude, and death. This frees *Dasein* to authentically care about itself and its projects, an orientation toward the future. Loewald, almost alone in the field, calls on psychoanalysts to think about the future as a meaningful category. Loewald thinks that the clinical psychoanalyst carries a future vision of what his or her patient can become while at the same time reaches into the past to identify true regressions and restart psychic growth. For Heidegger, anxiety can disclose a fleeing from authenticity, but this awareness of fleeing can free *Dasein* to attend to its future projects, for Loewald, he posits a relationship between the time modes of the past, present, and future. Loewald characterizes the call of conscience as serving a similar role to Heidegger’s expression of basic anxiety. I will finish with this quote from Loewald (1971b), which is profoundly Heideggerian:

I have implied that the object of psychoanalysis is the individual human person. Only in this entity do we encounter what psychoanalysis calls psychic life and psychic reality.

(p. 104)

Notes

- 1 From Safranski (1998), a biography.
- 2 See Rothman (2014) and Brody (2014) for a general description of the issues involved, and Tawny (2015) for a detailed exposition.
- 3 Both Husserl and Freud took courses from Franz Brentano, who originated the idea of intentionality.
Brentano stated: "Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena" (1995, p. 89).
- 4 The title of a collection of Heidegger's (1998) essays (*Wegmarken*) meant to convey the activity of a woodsman working in the depths of the woods.
- 5 This is an area of controversy, as Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between humans and animals and others would attribute partial consciousness to animals.
- 6 Alternately translated as destroyed or deconstructed.
- 7 See Lear (1988) for the complete argument.
- 8 The second reference is to Heidegger.
- 9 From Freud (1905), p. 260.
- 10 The metaphor of sculpture picks up the Aristotelian discussion of potentiality and actuality found in the section on Being-in-the-world, which Heidegger interprets as bringing forth.
- 11 The third reference is to Heidegger.

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